Another Paper
February 15, 2011
This is another paper I wrote for American Heritage. It asks to analyze the arguments of the Anti-Federalists and the Federalists in terms of Montesquieu’s On the Spirit of Laws. And yes, the title is a pull from Plato.
Montesquieu’s Republic
The Tea Party views the Constitution as the very model of limited government and freedom. Ironically, when the Framers penned this document, many condemned it as oppressive and tyrannical. Much of the debate between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists focused on Montesquieu’s On the Spirit of Laws. Anti-Federalists argue that a consolidated republic over such a large territory can only produce tyranny. The Federalists rejoin by challenging the Anti-Federalists interpretation of Montesquieu and arguing that an extensive republic is necessary to secure the right of its citizens. Only the Federalist position actually addresses the Constitution, making their arguments more persuasive.
Montesquieu’s definitive work on government, Of the Spirit of Laws, provided much of the ground for the Constitutional debate; both sides quoted it extensively. The Anti-Federalists summarize their Montequieuan arguments in “Letter of Brutus,” explicitly citing Montesquieu as justification for their general position. Although Montesquieu does not specifically make many of the arguments found in “Letter of Brutus,” the Anti-Federalists’ arguments are merely application of Montesquieu’s general principles specifically to the United States. Thus one may analyze the arguments in “Letters of Brutus” within the context of Montesquieu.
Quoting directly from Montesquieu, “Letter of Brutus” asserts a republic must be geographically small in order to secure its citizens’ rights. In a large republic, the will of the people cannot check governmental power; each person is little represented and the will of the people is obscured. Additionally, the multitude of interests within the country will governance impossible, for the interests of New Hampshire and Georgia are so opposed that their representatives can never work in harmony. When the public will is both unknowable to representatives and irreconcilable with other regions’ wills, the rich take control. Only the rich have the influence to gain access to their representatives and the wealth to advance their agenda. Tyranny is born when the rich use this access and influence to trample the liberty of the poor and “[begin] to think…that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country” (Montesquieu VIIII.16). In contrast to a large republic, the Anti-Federalists argue, a small republic allows each citizen to participate more closely in government, thus abuse is “of course…less protected.” (Montesquieu, VIIII.16)
“Letters to Brutus” argues that not only the United States as a whole, but the representative districts themselves are too large to maintain a republic. In a small republic, representatives often know their constituents personally, allowing those in power to accurately represent the will of the people. However, under the Constitution a representative’s district is so large that he could not possibly know the will of his electors. Thus the House cannot truly represent the people, and becomes tyrannical. The only remedy is to create make the House of Representatives so large it is unable to pass legislation. If this occurs, the public will cannot be upheld as the government ceases to function, creating anarchy.
Finally, “Letter of Brutus” argues that a republican government possesses insufficient coercive power, requiring despotic measures to enforce laws. When the common man stands so far away from the center of power he neither respects nor fears the federal government. He will never follow the law under such circumstances. The only remedy is threat of force through a standing army. At this point a nation becomes despotic and forfeits the distinctions of “republican” and “free.” Thus, without an energetic, despotic government the executive and legislative branches will fail, causing the failure of the republican government as a whole.
The Federalist first argues that the Constitution does not institute the kind of republican government Montesquieu argued against. In Federalist 9 Alexander Hamilton asserts that Montesquieu assumes modern republics are essentially copies of the ancient republics. Hamilton readily admits that any “friends of liberty” (Federalist 9) agree the Roman style of republicanism fails to effectively govern a city, much less a nation. The Constitution, however, makes significant improvements upon the Roman and Greek models. Such institutions as the separation of powers, checks and balances, a separate judiciary, and direct election allow the government to check back against tyranny. Montesquieu did not take these factors into account, thus his arguments cannot be applied to the Constitution.
The Federalist further argues that the United States is not a true republic, but a federal republic. In a pure republic, all power is vested in one national, or central government and the state governments are subject to the national government in every respect. However, as Federalist 39 argues, under the Constitution the states are supreme in all but a few specifically defined areas. Additionally, the state governments can de facto control the federal government through the elections of Senators and the President. This is the great “double security” (Federalist 51), tyranny is avoided because the powerful state governments check back the already limited federal government.
Not only does the Constitutional government avoid the disadvantages of a large republic, but according to The Federalist it reaps the benefits of both a small republic and a large despotic state. The Constitution creates what Montesquieu defines as a confederated republic, or “an assemblage of societies” (Federalist 9) As long as those societies[1] maintain some degree of independence and are able to direct the course of the federal government, the extent of the federal government is of little consequence. Arguments against a consolidated republic do not apply to the federal government, while the advantages of a confederated government are realized. According to Montesquieu, such a republic avoids the threat of tyranny, corruption, and external takeover.
The Federalist further asserts the Anti-Federalist appeals to Montesquieu are fundamentally inconsistent. According to Montesquieu’s definition, the states are too to exist as republics. According to Montesquieu, Sparta was the ideal size for a republic. Every state is significantly larger than one Greek city-state. Thus for the sake of consistency Anti-Federalists must also be anti-state sovereignty. This inconsistency invalidates the Anti-Federalist alternative to the Constitution, which is the continuance of the Articles of Confederation. Therefore, according to the Anti-Federalists’ own logic, either alternative will fail.
The Federalist additionally argues that the multiplicity of interests will actually serve to check the power of the government, not bring tyranny as the Anti-Federalists claim. The United States contains such a diverse population that there are not merely two parties,[2] but many. Each of these parties constitutes a minority, and as Federalist 51 argues, the combination of these parties into one majority is extremely unlikely. Even if they were to combine, it is unlikely they could act as a unified force within the legislature. This is the great security inherent in a large federal republic.
Furthermore, even if a faction gained control of any particular part of the government, the very structure of the government prevents tyranny. Federalist 51 argues that the legislative branch is by far the most powerful and most fearsome of the three branches. The Constitution therefore divides the legislature into two separate houses, each with distinct responsibilities, yet powerless without the cooperation of the other. Thus, even if one of the houses became tyrannical, it could not dominate the government. Additionally, legislative power is checked by the executive because of Presidential veto. One party would have control every branch of government before tyranny could be instituted. Even then, the power of the states acts as a check on governmental power. It is therefore unlikely that a government bound by the Constitution would become tyrannical.
This debate cannot be adjudicated within the context of Montesquieu, for neither party accurately depicts Montesquieu’s arguments. The Anti-Federalists obviously contradict themselves in favoring state governments while citing Montesquieu in their attacks on the Constitution. This contradiction invalidates their Montesquieuan arguments, for their advocacy shifts to suit the situation. The Federalist position is likewise invalidated, because nowhere does Montesquieu provide a specific definition of a confederated government. The only definition given is so vague both the Constitution and Articles of Confederation meet it. Only The Federalist defines this term in such a way to provide any degree of specificity. The conflict of interest is self-evident; the reader must Montesquieuan arguments on both sides. The debate can only be adjudicated by the warrants given in “Letter of Brutus” and The Federalist.
The Federalist arguments are superior to those of the Anti-Federalists, for only the Federalist position addresses the Constitution proper. The Anti-Federalists incorrectly assume that the Constitution duplicates the Roman system of government. The separation of powers and the states’ power check federal authority. Furthermore, the multiplicity of interests assures the rich do not gain control of the government, while compromise assures Congress operates despite differing opinions. The Anti-Federalist position also forgets the character of the American people. Americans fought a prolonged war with England to free themselves from tyranny, and several revolts had occurred since the War in opposition to supposed tyranny. It is evident that, even if the Constitutional government became tyrannical, the people of the United States would check back such tyranny.
Montesquieu recognizes that liberty is not perpetual. He states that “Since all human things have an end, the State of which we speak will lose its liberty; it will perish” (XI.6). History shows that many of “Letter of Brutus’s” arguments have come about. However, despite this seeming failure of the Constitution, it must be remembered that the federal government has secured liberty for millions of people for over two hundred years. Additionally, even though many Anti-Federalist claims have come about, the United States is still one of the freest nations the world has ever seen. One cannot say the Constitution is tyrannical, for it provides for liberty at home and protection from threats abroad. Only the ideal government, Montesquieu argues, can produce such security.
